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Abstract  
This paper documents the social impacts of the financial crisis in Asia. We provide a general 
overview of the causes and the evolution of the crisis and highlight the differences as well as 
the similarities among the affected Asian countries. In particular, the impacts of the crisis on 
unemployment, real wage, poverty, and income inequality are analyzed using a cross-country 
data set, which consists of all the countries that have received financial assistance from the 
IMF over the period from 1973 to 1994. The stylized pattern of employment growth in 
previous IMF program countries indicates that employment growth is more sluggish in the 
recovery process compared with other macroeconomic variables. Hence, unemployment 
rates can remain high for a long period even after the crisis ends in the Asian countries. We 
also find that the crisis aggravates poverty for marginal groups of the population over a 
significant period, even though it does not bear a long-term effect on overall income 
distribution. Policy implications of our findings in building social safety nets in Asia are also 
discussed.  
   
I. Introduction  It has already been more than a year since the financial crisis which erupted in Thailand 
developed into the financial collapse in Asia. It has continued to deepen and broaden more 
than anyone anticipated. Its contagion has now spread to Latin America and Russia, and is 
currently making the global capitalist system come apart at the seams. This financial collapse 
in Asia was also followed by an economic and social collapse. Asian countries are now 
struggling to escape from the miseries of declining income, rising unemployment, and 
increasing poverty.  
While there has been much recent research on the causes and the economic impact of the 
Asian crisis, its social impacts have been relatively neglected. To fill this discrepancy, this 
paper assesses the severity of the Asian crisis and its social consequences. For decades, Asian 
countries enjoyed high growth, low unemployment rates, relatively equal income 
distribution, and low crime rates. Therefore, compared with other crisis-hit countries, the 
social impacts of the crisis - such as rising unemployment and income inequality - have been 
felt more painfully in Asia and has led to disastrous social consequences. To make matters 
worse, most Asian countries have not yet developed a meaningful social safety net. This 
paper documents the social impact of the crisis in the most affected Asian countries, notably 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, and tries to draw policy implications.  
Section II begins with a general overview of the cause and extent of the Asian crisis and 
highlights the differences as well as similarities among Asian countries. The key features of 
the Asian crisis are large inflows and sudden withdrawals of foreign capital. We review the 
extent of foreign capital inflows and outflows in these Asian countries and then analyze 
which factors caused the sudden change in foreign investors’ confidence in these economies. 
The role of financial liberalization and globalization in the eruption of the crisis is closely 
examined. We also pay special attention to the role of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
adjustment programs in handling the Asian crisis. In order to assess the economic and social 
impacts of the crisis and predict its future development, it is imperative to understand the 
IMF conditionality attached to its financial support for the Asian countries. Moreover, the 
IMF adjustment program in Asia is being severely criticized as the "same old belt-tightening 
adjustment" or "one-size-fits-all approach." The frequent emergency IMF bailouts have also 
been blamed for contributing to new moral hazards in international lending. To evaluate 
these criticisms, we review the general characteristics of IMF programs as well as the specific 
content of programs with Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.  
Section III analyzes the disastrous social impacts of the Asian crisis. We assess the current 
social impacts of the crisis in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand and then provide a prediction 
for its long-term development. To make a long-term prediction, the social impacts of the 
financial crisis are analyzed in a broad historical and international perspective. This paper 
consults the records of all countries that have experienced a currency crisis and received 
conditional financial assistance from the IMF during the period of 1973 to 1994. From this 
cross-country data we draw some stylized facts about the impacts of IMF programs on social 
variables such as unemployment, real wage, poverty, and inequality. Then we compare these 
stylized facts with the cases of the three most severely affected countries, namely Indonesia, 
Korea, and Thailand.  Our cross-country analysis shows some stylized patterns of the social impacts of the crisis. 
For example, we find that employment growth is more sluggish in the recovery process than 
other macroeconomic variables. This implies that unemployment rates can remain at a 
higher level for a long period after the crisis, even if output growth, inflation rates, etc., are 
restored to their pre-crisis level. We also find that the burden of the crisis is distributed 
unequally. It is the marginal groups such as the poor, the less experienced, the less-educated, 
women, and young workers who are most severely affected by the crisis. As a consequence, 
even though the crisis does not bear a long-term effect on overall income distribution, it 
definitely aggravates poverty for the victimized core group over a significant period. We 
think these findings have many important policy implications, especially for building social 
safety nets in these Asian countries during the crisis. Section IV and the conclusion of the 
paper discuss and summarize the policy implications of our study.  
   
II. Origins and Evolution of the Asian Crisis  
Needless to say, the origins and the nature of the Asian crisis are multifaceted and the forms 
of evolution are significantly different among Asian countries. But they all share one 
common phenomenon: large-scale inflow of foreign capital and its sudden outflow. In 
evaluating various hypotheses for the origins of the Asian crisis, it is therefore important to 
understand what caused the sudden change of foreign investors’ confidence in Asian 
countries. In section II.1, we first review the pre-crisis macroeconomic conditions of Asian 
countries to see whether they were so aggravated as to justify the sudden loss of foreign 
investors’ confidence. In particular, macroeconomic policies such as fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate management before the crisis will be compared with those of Latin American 
cases in the 1980s. Section II.2 then examines in detail to what extent the globalization of 
international financial markets contributed to the changes in the amount and the structure of 
external liabilities of Asian countries. In this regard, we will try to highlight the differences as 
well as the commonality among Asian countries in the origins and the evolution of the crisis. 
After the crisis began, the highly infected countries – Thailand, Indonesia and Korea – 
requested IMF financial support and are currently under IMF adjustment programs. In 
Section II.3, we discuss the nature of IMF adjustment programs in general and the contents 
of the IMF policies for Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, respectively.  
II.1 Macroeconomic Conditions and Policies  
Table 2.1 shows the macroeconomic performance of selected Asian countries from the mid 
1970s until the onset of the crisis. The first three sub-tables are for the worst-affected Asian 
countries; the other tables are for the less-affected countries. For comparison, the table 
includes Mexico and Argentina.  
Growth, Inflation, Unemployment and Macroeconomic Policies  
As can be seen in Table 2.1, Asian countries continued their solid growth performance 
throughout the 1990s. Except for Japan and Taiwan, their average real GDP growth rates 
during 1990-95 were higher than or at least comparable to their historical averages. It is noteworthy that even the worst-hit countries – Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand – all 
experienced average growth rates well above 7% during this period.  
The performance was equally impressive in terms of price stability. Except for China and the 
Philippines, the inflation rates of Asian countries in the 1990s were modest at least by 
developing-country standards and remained at a one-digit level. Even the inflation rates of 
China and the Philippines were quite low compared with the hyperinflation Mexico and 
Argentina experienced before their debt crises in the 1980s. We can also see that China and 
the Philippines enjoyed virtually full employment prior to the crisis; unemployment rates 
were less than 3% in these economies.
1 Understandably, the long period of full employment 
experience is making the current crisis harder to swallow for the workers in this region.  
   
   
Table 2.1  
Macroeconomic Performance before the Crisis  
Selected Economies in Asia and Latin America 
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90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  7.0  8.1  9.0  11.6  8.1  8.2  8.5  8.9  8.7  5.5  -0.4 
Inflation  9.0  3.1  5.0  6.0  5.7  4.1  3.4  5.1  5.8  5.9  5.6 
UE  -  3.2  -  2.2  2.7  1.4  1.5  -  -  -  - 
CA/GDP  -5.6  -3.2  -6.7  -8.3  -7.7  -5.6  -5.0  -5.6  -7.9  -7.9  -2.2 
Saving  19.6  25.4  34.4  32.6  35.2  34.3  34.9  34.9  34.3  33.7  32.9 
Investment  23.6  27.7  40.4  40.2  41.6  39.2  39.4  39.9  41.8  41.7  35.0 
Export  14.7  17.6  18.9  14.9  23.2  14.2  13.2  22.7  25.1  -1.3  - 
Budget  -5.8  -3.0  3.0  4.4  4.2  2.6  2.1  2.0  2.6  1.6  -0.4 
Money  19.3  18.8  18.4  26.7  19.8  15.6  18.4  12.9  17.0  12.6  16.4 RE(US$)  0.83  1.00  0.97  1  0.99  0.99  0.98  0.94  0.92  0.91  - 
RE(Yen)  0.64  0.90  1.09  1  1.05  1.04  1.14  1.20  1.10  0.94  - 
Indonesia  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  6.2  5.5  8.0  9.0  8.9  7.2  7.3  7.5  8.2  8.0  5.0 
Inflation  15.0  8.1  8.7  7.8  9.4  7.5  9.7  8.5  9.4  7.9  6.6 
UE  -  2.6*  -  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.8  4.4  -  4.1  - 
CA/GDP  -1.2  -3.5  -2.5  -2.8  -3.4  -2.2  -1.5  -1.7  -3.3  -3.3  -2.6 
Saving  19.3  23.2  28.9  27.9  28.7  27.3  31.4  29.2  29.0  28.8  27.3 
Investment  19.8  24.3  27.2  28.3  27.0  25.8  26.3  27.6  28.4  28.1  26.5 
Export  16.0  0.8  12.7   15.9  13.5  16.6  8.4  8.8  13.4  9.7  - 
Budget  -  -1.3  0.05  1.3  -  -1.2  -0.7  -  0.8  1.4  2.0 
Money  29.3  27.0  24.9  44.6  17.5  19.8  20.2  20.0  27.2  27.2  - 
RE(US$)  0.45  0.84  0.97  1  1.00  0.99  0.95  0.94  0.92  0.91  1.70 
RE(Yen)  0.35  0.77  1.08  1  1.06  1.04  1.09  1.19  1.11  0.94  1.56 
Korea  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  7.0  9.6  7.8  9.5  9.1  5.1  5.8  8.6  8.9  7.1  5.5 
Inflation  17.6  3.8  6.6  8.6  9.3  6.2  4.8  6.3  4.5  4.9  4.5 
UE  -  3.4  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.4  2.8  2.4  2.0  2.0  2.7 
CA/GDP  -4.6  2.5  -1.4  -0.9  -3.0  -1.5  0.1  -1.2  -2.0  -4.9  -2.0 Saving  25.7  32.7  35.3  36.1  35.9  35.1  35.2  34.6  35.1  33.3  32.9 
Investment  29.4  29.4  36.7  37.1  38.4  36.6  36.0  35.7  36.6  36.8  36.6 
Export  22.8  16.7  12.6  4.2  10.5  6.6  7.3  16.7  30.3  3.7  5.0 
Budget*  -  -  -0.4  -0.9  -1.9  -0.7  0.3  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.03 
Money  30.0  16.8  17.5  17.2  21.9  14.9  16.6  18.7  15.6  15.8  14.1 
RE(US$)  1.02  1.16  0.99  1  1.01  1.02  1.03  0.97  0.93  1.00  1.97 
RE(Yen)  0.79  1.03  1.11  1  1.08  1.07  1.19  1.23  1.12  1.03  1.80 
China  







90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  6.0  10.7  10.6  3.8  9.2  14.2  13.5  12.6  10.5  9.7  8.8 
Inflation  2.1  9.0  9.9  2.1  2.7  5.4  13.0  21.7  14.8  6.1  1.5 
UE  -  2.1  2.6  2.5  2.3  2.3  2.6  2.8  2.9  3.0  - 
CA/GDP  0.7  -1.0  1.2  3.4  3.5  1.5  -2.7  1.4  0.2  0.9  2.4 
Saving  39.3  35.2  39.7  38.1  38.3  37.7  40.6  42.6  41.0  42.9  40.8 
Investment  21.3  29.5  32.0  25.5  27.5  31.2  37.5  36.0  34.7  35.6  35.8 
Export  16.5  13.4  19.2  18.2  15.8  18.1  7.1  33.1  22.9  1.6  20.9 
Budget  -
1.0  
-1.7  -2.0  -2.0  -2.2  -2.3  -2.0  -1.6  -1.7  -1.5  -1.5 
Money  22.3  26.1  32.3  28.9  26.7  30.8  42.8  35.1  29.5  25.3  20.7 
RE(US$)  -  -  1.05  1  1.05  1.07  0.97  1.17  1.01  0.96  0.95 
RE(Yen)  -  -  1.18  1  1.11  1.13  1.12  1.49  1.21  0.99  0.87 
Hong Kong  






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  9.3  7.2  5.0  3.4  5.1  6.3  6.1  5.4  3.9  4.9  5.3 
Inflation  8.6  6.7  9.3  9.7  11.6  9.3  8.5  8.1  8.7  6.0  5.7 
UE  -  2.7  2.0  1.3  1.8  2.0  2.0  1.9  3.2  2.8  2.2 
CA/GDP  1.9  8.3  4.5  8.9  7.1  5.7  7.4  1.6  -3.9  -1.3  -1.5 
Saving  29.7  33.6  33.5  35.8  33.8  33.8  34.6  33.1  30.4  30.6  31.1 
Investment  27.8  23.6  28  26.4  26.6  27.4  27.3  29.8  30.5  31.3  32.0 
Export  18.0  20.1  15.6  12.3  20.0  21.2  13.2  11.9  14.8  4.0  4.0 
Budget  1.5  1.6  1.6  0.7  3.2  2.5  2.3  1.1  -0.3  2.2  3.8 
Money  -  -  -  -  -  8.5  14.5  11.7  10.6  12.5  8.8 
RE(US$)  -  -   0.86  1  0.93  0.89  0.83  0.79  0.74  0.72  0.70 
RE(Yen)  -  -  0.96  1  0.99  0.94  0.96  1.00  0.89  0.75  0.64 
Japan  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  3.9  4.1  2.1  5.1  3.8  1.0  0.3  0.6  1.5  3.9  0.9 
Inflation  6.6  1.4  1.7  3.1  3.3  1.7  1.2  0.7  -0.1  0.1  1.7 
UE  -  2.6  2.5  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.5  2.9  3.2  3.3  3.4 
CA/GDP  0.4  3.0  2.4  1.5  2.0  3.0  3.1  2.8  2.2  1.4  2.2 
Saving  31.9  31.9  32.7  33.5  34.2  33.8  32.8  31.4  30.7  31.3  30.8 
Investment  30.9  28.4  30.0  31.7  31.4  30.5  29.5  28.6  28.5  29.7  28.4 
Export  10.4  10.4  8.4  5.0  9.5  8.0  6.6  9.6  11.6  -7.3  2.4 
Budget  -4.0  -0.4  -0.05  2.9  2.9  1.5  -1.6  -2.3  -3.6  -4.3  -3.4 Money  10.7  9.2  3.1  8.2  2.5  -0.1  2.2  3.1  2.8  2.3  3.1 
RE(US$)  1.31  1.18  0.89  1  0.94  0.95  0.87  0.79  0.83  0.97  1.09 
RE(Yen)  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Malaysia  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  7.1  5.4  8.8  9.6  8.6  7.8  8.3  9.2  9.5  8.6  7.8 
Inflation  5.3  2.0  3.5  2.8  2.6  4.7  3.5  3.7  3.4  3.5  2.7 
UE  -  7.3*  3.6  5.1  4.3  3.7  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.5  2.7 
CA/GDP  -2.0  -0.7  -6.2  -2.1  -8.8  -3.8  -4.8  -7.8  -10.0  -4.9  -4.8 
Saving  21.6  29.4  31.3  29.1  28.4  31.3  33.0  32.7  33.5  36.6  38.0 
Investment  29.4  28.5  37.7  32.4  36.4  36.0  38.3  40.1  43.0  42.2  42.7 
Export  15.0  12.0  19.9  17.4  16.8  18.5  15.7  24.7  26.0  5.1  - 
Budget  -  -4.0  -0.3  -2.2  0.1  -3.5  -2.6  2.5  3.8  4.2  1.6 
Money  20.2  9.2  19.3  10.6  16.9  29.2  26.6  12.7  20.0  25.3  17.5 
RE(US$)  0.68  0.86  0.96  1  1.01  0.95  0.98  0.92  0.89  0.88  1.34 
RE(Yen)  0.53  0.78  1.07  1  1.07  1.00  1.13  1.16  1.06  0.91  1.23 
Philippines  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  5.6  1.1  2.3  3.0  -0.6  0.3  2.1  4.4  4.8  5.7  5.1 
Inflation  11.0  15.4  10.8  12.7  18.7  8.9  7.6  9.0  8.1  8.4  5.1 
UE  -  7.2  8.6  8.1  9.0  8.6  8.9  8.4  8.4  -  - CA/GDP  -6.5  -0.3  -4.1  -6.1  -2.3  -1.6  -5.5  -4.6  -4.4  -4.7  -5.4 
Saving  19.9  18.1  18.6  18.7  18.0  19.5  18.4  19.4  17.8  19.7  21.0 
Investment  26.7  20.7  22.4  24.0  20.0  20.9  23.8  23.6  22.2  23.2  25.1 
Export  11.9  7.2  14.9  4.0  8.7  11.2  13.7  20.0  31.6  16.7  22.9 
Budget  -2.0  -2.8  -1.9  -3.5  -2.1  -1.2  -1.6  -1.6  -1.4  -0.4  -0.9 
Money  20.5  21.4  21.5  22.5  17.3  13.6  27.1  24.4  24.2  23.2  26.1 
RE(US$)  0.68  0.91  0.78  1  0.84  0.74  0.79  0.65  0.67  0.63  0.94 
RE(Yen)  0.53  0.81  0.87  1  0.89  0.78  0.91  0.83  0.80  0.66  0.86 
Singapore  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  8.0  6.9  8.7  9.0  7.3  6.2  10.4  10.5  8.8  7.0  7.8 
Inflation  4.2  1.0  2.7  3.5  3.4  2.3  2.3  3.1  1.7  1.4  2.0 
UE  -  3.8  2.4  1.7  1.9  2.7  2.7  2.6  2.7  3.0  2.4 
CA/GDP  -8.8  1.8  11.9  8.3  11.2  11.9  7.2  16.0  16.8  15.7  15.2 
Saving  33.4  42.0  46.9  44.1  45.4  47.3  44.9  49.8  50.0  50.1  51.9 
Investment  38.2  38.1  33.8  31.8  33.3  35.6  35.0  33.6  33.3  36.5  35.4 
Export  16.4  12.4  17.9  18.1  11.9  7.6  16.6  30.8  22.1  5.7  0.0 
Budget  0.6  4.8  12.2  11.4  10.3  11.3  14.3  13.7  12.0  9.1  10.3 
Money  16.2  12.5  12.1  20.0  12.4  8.9  8.5  14.4  8.5  9.8  10.3 
RE(US$)  0.93  1.07  0.92  1  0.94  0.96  0.94  0.85  0.83  0.84  1.01 
RE(Yen)  0.72  0.96  1.03  1  1.00  1.01  1.09  1.08  1.00  0.87  0.92 
Taiwan  






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  8.5  9.2  6.4  5.4  7.6  6.8  6.3  6.5  6.0  5.7  6.9 
Inflation  8.6  1.2  3.8  4.1  3.6  4.5  2.9  4.1  3.7  3.1  1.1 
UE  -  1.9  1.5  1.6  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.8  2.6  2.7 
CA/GDP  1.6  12.9  4.3  6.8  6.9  4.0  3.2  2.7  2.1  4.0  2.3 
Saving  30.2  35.0  28.2  29.3  29.5  27.8  27.7  27.1  28.0  28.0  27.9 
Investment  27.8  20.4  22.8  22.4  22.2  23.2  23.7  22.9  22.9  21.0  21.0 
Export  20.2  17.4  9.3  1.6  13.4  6.9  4.0  9.6  20.0  3.7  - 
Budget  -  1.3  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2 
Money  22.3  24.4  15.0  10.5  19.7  19.6  15.5  15.2  9.6  4.7  - 
** Latin America  
Mexico  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  5.9  0.9  2.2  5.1  4.2  3.6  2.0  4.5  -6.2  5.2  7.0 
Inflation  26.1  82.5  19.4  26.7  22.7  15.5  9.8  7.0  35.0  34.4  20.6 
UE  -  -  -     2.2  -  2.4  -  4.7  3.7  - 
CA/GDP  -5.1  1.00  -5.5  -3.2  -5.2  -7.4  -5.8  -11.1  -0.6  -0.6  - 
Saving  34.4  24.3  19.6  21.7  20.3  18.9  17.0  17.1  22.7  23.4  - 
Investment  23.7  18.6  18.7  18.4  19.2  20.5  18.6  19.3  16.1  17.2  - 
Export  29.9  2.5  13.9  17.7  0.7  1.4  9.2  14.2  40.3  22.6  - 
Budget  -4.5  -9.3  -0.4  -2.8  -0.2  1.5  0.3  -0.7  -0.6  -  - 
Money  49.4  72.6  36.3  75.8  49.3  22.8  14.5  21.7  33.3  26.2  - RE(US$)  2.76  1.46  1.00  1  0.88  0.80  0.75  1.23  1.34  1.06  0.93 
RE(Yen)  0.72  1.34  1.14  1  0.94  0.85  0.87  1.57  1.61  1.10  0.86 
Argentina  
   






90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97 
Growth  0.2  0.0  4.9  -1.3  10.5  10.3  6.3  8.5  -4.6  4.2  8.4 
Inflation  188.5  755.3  421.5  2314.  171.7  24.9  10.6  4.2  3.4  0.2  0.8 
UE  -  5.3  10.5  9.2  5.8  6.7  10.1  12.1  18.8  18.4  - 
CA/GDP  -1.0  -4.6  -1.1  3.7  -0.4  -2.4  -3.0  -3.6  -1.0  -1.3  - 
Saving  32.8  21.9  17.2  19.8  16.3  15.1  16.4  17.4  18.1  17.4  - 
Investment  26.1  18.5  17.0  14.0  14.6  16.7  18.4  20.0  18.0  17.6  - 
Export  10.9  4.7  14.8  28.9  -3.0  2.1  7.2  19.4  33.9  13.6  - 
Budget  -   -2.4  -0.4  -0.3  -0.5  -
0.03 
-0.6  -0.7  -0.5  -1.8  - 
Money  -  -  230.0  1113  141.3  62.5  46.5  17.6  -2.8  18.7   -  
RE(US$)  -  3.24  0.63  1  0.69  0.56  0.53  0.52  0.52  0.53  - 
RE(Yen)  -  3.27  0.70  1  0.73  0.59  0.61  0.66  0.62  0.55  0.50 
Note:  
1. UE of 1983-1989 for Indonesia and Malaysia is calculated using only data for 1985-1989.  
2. Budget data for Korea is a consolidated central government budget.  
3. UE of 1983-1989 for Taiwan is calculated using data for 1980-1989.  
4. In Mexico and Argentina, CA/GDP was calculated using data for 1977-1982.  
5. In Mexico and Argentina, the saving rate was calculated using only private consumption data for 1977-1982.  
6. In Argentina, investment was calculated using data only for 1978-1982.  
Sources and Definition of Data:  
Growth rate: real GDP growth rates, World Economic Outlook (IMF).  
Inflation: CPI inflation rates, World Economic Outlook.  
UE: Unemployment rates, Yearbook of Labor Statistics (ILO), International Financial Statistics (IMF).  
CA/GDP: Current Account Balance over GDP, World Economic Outlook.  
Saving: Private saving rates, World Economic Outlook.  
Invest Investment rates, World Economic Outlook.  
Export: growth rates of export revenue in U.S. dollar terms, International Financial Statistics.  Budget: General government fiscal balance over GDP: World Economic Outlook.  
Money: M2 growth rates (end of year), World Economic Outlook, International Financial Statistics.  
RE: Real exchange rates based on CPI (end of year), International Financial Statistics (1990=100).  
Data for Latin American countries are from International Financial Statistics.  
Monetary and fiscal policies have been conservative, too. The growth rates of M2 during the 
1990s were in line with their historical averages in the Asian countries, and incomparably 
lower than those of Mexico and Argentina. The absence of high inflation is indirect evidence 
of the discipline of monetary policies. Fiscal stance was in general, prudent. Only China and 
the Philippines incurred persistent fiscal deficits during the 1990s, but the magnitude was 
very modest at less than 2% of GDP. Note that Thailand, where the Asian crisis first 
erupted in July 1997, maintained a fiscal surplus every year in the 1990s.
2 This is in sharp 
contrast with the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s. One of the key features of 
the Latin American debt crisis was the mismanagement of macroeconomic policies – large 
budget deficits and consequent monetary expansion.
3 To the contrary, the current Asian 
crisis was definitely not a result of profligate fiscal and monetary policies.  
Current Account and Exchange Rate Management  
In fact, a sign of disequilibrium is evident only from the behavior of current account 
balances. The three worst-affected countries – Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea – along with 
Malaysia and the Philippines, incurred current account deficits persistently in 1990s. In 
Indonesia and Korea, the size of the current account deficits was modest, but in Thailand 
and Malaysia, they were well above 5% of GDP. In hindsight, it is hard to deny that the 
sizable current account deficits contributed to undermining foreign investors’ confidence. 
However, there was good reason to underestimate their significance prior to the crisis. As 
presented in Table 2.1, these countries were maintaining very high private savings rates and 
even higher investment rates. The current account deficits during this period reflected 
shortfalls in savings relative to investment, instead of private or public dissavings.
4 High 
growth performance in the past decades had taught the Asian people to believe that 
investment is a virtue and that the current account deficits caused by the investment boom 
should not ring an alarm. Moreover, as will be explained later, the growing current account 
deficits in some countries in 1996 were mainly due to country-specific shocks such as the 
drastic fall in international prices of export items such as semi-conductors, consumer 
electronics, and petrochemical products.
5 Since the sharp drop of export prices was regarded 
as temporary, the current account deficits were expected to quickly improve.  
The sizable current account deficits in these Asian countries led many to suspect the 
possibility of mismanaged exchange rates. In fact Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdes (1995) 
argue that an overvalued peso played a most important role in the Mexican crisis in 1994. 
However, it is controversial whether the currencies in the Asian countries were significantly 
overvalued prior to the crisis. Most of the Asian countries effectively pegged their currencies 
to the U.S. dollar. When the dollar weakened in 1990 and 1995, they all depreciated together 
with the dollar vis-à-vis the European currencies and the Japanese yen. Conversely, when the 
dollar appreciated markedly against the yen in mid-1995, they all appreciated sharply against 
the yen. This pattern can be confirmed in Table 2.1 from the behavior of real exchange rates. 
The Table reports two real exchange rates - one against the U.S. dollar and the other against 
the Japanese yen.
6 Between 1990-96 in most Asian countries, real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar did not change much. But the real exchange rate against the yen depreciated 
slightly before 1995 and then sharply appreciated beginning in 1995.  
In order to judge the extent of overvaluation, we have to look at real exchange rates in trade-
weighted terms. However, Table 2.1 shows that the extent of overvaluation in each currency 
was not large either against the dollar or the yen during the 1990s.
7 For example, prior to its 
crisis in 1994, the Mexican peso was about 20% and 13% overvalued against the dollar and 
the yen. However, except for Hong Kong and the Philippines, no Asian country in the Table 
shows a comparable degree of overvaluation. Therefore, even without estimating trade-
weighted real exchange rates, we can conjecture that the real exchange rates in the Asian 
countries were only mildly overvalued prior to the crisis.
8  
If their exchange rates were not too overvalued, why did export growth in the Asian 
countries (except the Philippines) begin to slow down in the mid-1990s and then drop 
sharply in 1996? For example, Thailand’s export revenue actually fell by 1% in 1996 after 
two years of high growth in excess of 20%. In Korea, the growth rates of export revenue 
changed from 30% to 4% between 1995 and 1996. Several factors contributed to the loss of 
international competitiveness:  
•  the devaluation of the Chinese yuan in January 1994; 
•  added competitive pressure from Mexico after NAFTA and the peso devaluation; 
•  a decrease of import demand coupled with the downturn in Europe and Japan; 
•  the world-wide glut and sharp fall of the electronics market (particularly for Korea, 
Malaysia, and Singapore); 
•  slow growth in the Asian region itself – including China, Malaysia, and Thailand – 
after introducing policies to cool down overheating asset markets. 
But it is important to remember that currency overvaluation was not a major factor in the 
loss of international competitiveness prior to the Asian crisis.  
Policy Mistakes in Handling the Crisis
9  
We argued that unlike the Latin American countries in the early 1980s, Asian countries had 
not mismanaged macroeconomic policies prior to the crisis. Fiscal and monetary policies 
were conservative and the exchange rates were not extremely overvalued. However, this 
does not imply that the economic policy makers in these Asian countries were not 
responsible for the current crisis. In fact, by committing a series of policy mistakes in coping 
with the crisis in 1997, they unnecessarily aggravated the situation and completely lost 
reputations built on a history of prudent economic management. Among the series of policy 
mistakes, the crucial ones include their mal-handling of foreign reserves and domestic 
bankruptcy problems on the eve of the crisis; their unprofessional performance in 
negotiating with the IMF adjustment program; and inexperience in implementing economic 
policies within a global context. The followings are examples of each category.  
   
(1) On the eve of each crisis, when their foreign currency reserves were quickly drying out, 
the Indonesian, Korean, and Thai governments did not recognize the seriousness of the problem and wasted a substantial part of foreign reserves in futile foreign exchange market 
interventions. Such intervention swiftly depleted the official reserves, which in turn started a 
vicious circle of impairing foreign investor confidence and accelerating capital outflows. It 
also contributed to the loss of policy credibility and transparency. For example, in early 
November 1997, Korea’s central bank announced that its reserves were around $30 billion, 
but foreign investors estimated that actual usable reserves could be as low as $15 billion, 
worth only five weeks of imports and only a fifth of Korea’s short-term debt. They correctly 
understood that the announced numbers did not include dollars borrowed in forward market 
intervention and recalled that Thailand had committed as much as two-thirds of its reserves 
in that way.  
(2) As the symptoms of the crisis developed in early 1997, foreign credit lines to these Asian 
countries started to decrease or terminate. To restore foreign investor confidence, the Thai 
and Korean governments pledged they would guarantee the foreign liabilities of domestic 
financial institutions and bail out troubled private banks. Despite its naïve intention, it was a 
crucial policy mistake that paved the way for a private banking crisis and then led to a 
sovereign crisis. This announcement made the previous distinction between sovereign and 
private problems less clear, and foreign investors began to seriously evaluate the potential 
fiscal cost in restructuring troubled private sectors.  
(3) After the crisis broke out, an unwise and unnecessary discord with the IMF significantly 
undermined foreign investor confidence and aggravated the situation. Local news media 
described the IMF not as a counterpart for cooperation but as an invading army. In Korea, 
presidential candidates placed advertisements in newspapers vowing to renegotiate the IMF 
rescue pact if elected. In Indonesia, the disagreement over the currency board proposal 
struck a further blow to deteriorating foreign investor confidence. The economic difficulty 
was compounded by political uncertainty since the crisis happened during a politically 
unfortunate time. The three most-affected countries – Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand – all 
faced general elections during this period, which delayed or made it impossible to implement 
necessary policy actions.
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(4) One example that shows the lack of global economy experience was the Korean 
government’s decision to raise $US 2 billion just one week after signing the $US 55 billion 
IMF package. After signing the package, the government thought that the confidence 
problem was alleviated and tried to raise new capital through Korea Development Bank’s 
bond sales. Contrary to the government’s intentions, the timing of the bond sales surprised 
foreign investors. They regarded it as a sign of desperation and speculated that the Korean 
situation was much worse than they had expected. As investors balked at the bond sales and 
the yield spread increased by more than 200 basis points, the Korean government withdrew 
its sales plan. But it had already made the market more skeptical about the government’s 
ability to handle the crisis. 
In sum, considering the nature of the crisis, one may not criticize Asian policymakers for not 
being able to prevent the crisis. But we think they are without doubt responsible for 
unnecessarily aggravating situations by committing a series of policy mistakes in handling the 
crisis.  
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1.   It is widely recognized that unemployment statistics in these countries are 
considerably underestimated. Discouraged workers and the underemployed in 
informal sectors still account for a large portion of the population. In fact, 
employment growth rates in these countries were less impressive compared with 
their unemployment rates. 
2.   In the cases of Korea and Malaysia, extrabudgetary and quasi-fiscal operations 
account for a large proportion of public finance so that true fiscal positions were 
not as tight as the official statistics suggest. For example, in Korea, Cho and Rhee 
(1995) find that the estimated fiscal deficits were on average twice as large as the 
announced figures when extrabudgetary special funds and public enterprise 
operations were included in measuring fiscal balances. 
3.   Unlike their earlier experience, the fiscal conditions in Mexico and Argentina 
were healthy during the 1990s. 
4.   This fact is in sharp contrast with the Mexican crisis that erupted in late 1994. In 
Mexico, the large current account deficit before the crisis was largely the result of 
sustained increases in private consumption. See IMF (1997b, pp10-11). 
5.   For example, Korea’s export price index fell by 13% in 1996 alone. 
6.   The estimated real exchange rates are based on consumer price indices. The rates 
are normalized so that the 1990 value is equal to 1. A decrease in the index 
indicates real appreciation of the currency concerned. 
7.   We are implicitly assuming that the 1990 rate is an equilibrium value, as in 
Radelet and Sachs (1998b) 
8.   In fact, the trade-weighted real exchange rates in IMF confirm the same 
conclusion. See IMF (1998, p8). Redelt and Sachs (1998b) estimate that the real 
exchange rates appreciated about 25% between 1990 and early 1997 in the crisis-
hit Southeast Asian countries. But they conclude that the real appreciations in 
Asia were relatively modest compared with Brazil and Argentina who have seen 
real appreciations of more than 40% since 1990. 
9.   For more detailed information, refer to Park and Rhee (1998). 
10.  Thailand held a general election in November 1996. Korea and Indonesia held 
presidential elections in December 1997 and March 1998, respectively. 
 